

IPS Doc. No. 4025 (Item 11)

3815  
Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_

Berlin, 12 July 1941

St. Sec. No. 477

The Japanese Ambassador who came to see me on another matter today, mentioned that he had had an active exchange of telegrams recently with his foreign minister. He had tried to induce him to determine the center of gravity of further Japanese policy and to decide between South and North, for a dispersal of Japanese forces was impossible. In principle MATSUOKA has agreed that OSHIMA was right without, however, expressing himself concretely.

I then asked the Ambassador how things now stood with Indo-China. OSHIMA replied that in fact the occupation of certain positions in Southern Indo-China as a base for aircraft and warships was an urgent Japanese need. Whether one should previously inform the French Government or merely sound it out was another question. OSHIMA did not consider the move toward South Indo-China imminent. He named no term and thought that Tokyo would probably wait for a good opportunity. (The term of 17 July mentioned in wire report No. 1181 from Tokyo does not seem to be known to OSHIMA.)

OSHIMA gave, it is true, a few opinions on the further development of Japanese-American relations; he was, however, evidently poorly or not at all informed from home. He sought rather to gather some news from me. I then told him that there was up to now an only partially decoded report from Ambassador OTT which appeared to me to indicate that Tokyo had in the meantime received news from Washington. Without complete particulars I could not explain further. On the other hand, it had struck me personally with what naivete and impudence the Americans had now established themselves in Iceland. Did OSHIMA assume that the Americans considered their rear in the Pacific Ocean as secure as the Iceland case would really lead one to believe. OSHIMA answered that only /by saying/ that his own views on how America was to be handled were known to us. He had again advised MATSUOKA recently simply to break off the conversation with Washington.

(I do not believe that OSHIMA is aware that an answer from Washington is in Tokyo, a fact which came to our knowledge first from a certain source through the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.)

With this

to the German Foreign Minister

sig. WEIZSACKER

/Frame Nos. 147714-15/



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military  
Government for Germany (U.S.)

伯林、一九四一年七月十二日

國務事項第四七七號

Doc. 4025 (Item 11)

本日他ノ用件ヲ私ノ所ニ立寄ツタ日本大使ハ、  
彼ガ最近自國外務大臣ト活發ナル電報ノ交換ヲ  
行ツタト述ベタ。彼ヲ勸メテ今後ノ日本ノ政策  
ノ重點ヲ確定シ南北間ニ決定スル指示唆シタ何  
故ナレバ日本ノ勢力ヲ分散スルコトハ實現不可  
能ダカラ、原則トシテ松岡ハ大島ガ正シイ言フ  
コトニ同意ヲシタ。但具體的ナ意見ハ述べナカ  
ツタカ。

私ハ次ニ大使ニ印度支那ハドウナツテキルカ尋  
ネタ。大島ハ、實際南方印度支那ニ航空並ニ艦  
船基地トシテ或ル地點ヲ占領スルコトハ日本ノ  
緊急ナル必要デアルト答ヘタ。佛蘭國西政府ニ  
事前ニ通告スベキカ或ハ佛蘭西政府ノ意中ヲ探  
ルベカハ別問題デアツタ。大島ハ南印度支那進  
駐ガ間近ニ迫ツテキルモノトハ思ツテキナカツ  
タ。彼ハ何等期限ヲ指定シナカツタシ又東京ハ  
恐ラク好機會ヲ待ツテキルモノト信ジテキタ。

(東京ヨリノ電報報告第一一八一號中ニ於ケル  
七月十七日トイフ期限ハ大島ニハ知ラレテキナ  
イ様デアル)



2.

日米關係ノ今後ノ發展ニ就イテ大島ハ若干ノ觀察ヲ行ツタ、然シナガラ彼ハ本國カラハ明ラカニ不元分ニ或ハ全然通告先ヲ受ケテキナカツタ。寧ロ彼ハ私カラ何カ新シイ事ヲ聞キタカツテキタ。之ニ對シ私ハ甚ニ今迄部分的ニ解讀セタオット大使ノ報告ガアルガ。コノ報告ハ私ニハ恰モ其間ニ東京ガワシントンカラ報告ヲ得タト云フ感ヲ與ヘル様ニ思ヘタ。ト云ツタ完全ナル詳細ナクシテハ私ハソレ以上説明スルコトハ出来ナカツタ。コレニ對シテ個人的ニ私ノ注意ヲ惹イコトハ如何ニアツサリト鐵面皮ヲ以テ米國人ハ今ヤアイスランドニ陣取ツタカトイフコトデアル。

大島ハ米國人ガアイスランドノ件ガ實際ニ思ハシムル程ニ太平洋ノ彼等ノ背後ヲ安全ナセノト思ツテキルト信ジテタカドウカ。大島ハコレニ對シ只如何ニ米國ヲ處理スベキカトイフ彼ノ意見ハ我々周知ノ事デアルト答ヘタ。彼ハ又最近松岡ニワシントントノ會談ヲキツバリ中断スル様忠言シタ（私ハ、大島ハ、「ワシントン」カラノ返答ガ東京ニ來テキルコトヲ知ツテキナイト思フ。コノ事ハ最初ニ在東京伊太利大使館ヲ經テ或ル筋ヨリ我々ノ知ル所トナツタノデアル。

獨逸國外務大臣宛

Doc 4025 (Han 11)



供 述 書

余 W. P. Carrington  
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸ニ係ル政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル實情ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ在シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／柏林／文書本部ニ移官セラレタルモノナル事。

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部經營ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事。



四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、開發セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫真ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング  
( W. P. CHAMBERLING )

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード  
G. H. Garde

高級副官參務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部



*not used*

Doc. No. 4025 E (4)

Page 1.

Item 8

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)  
Tokyo, 20 January 1941 9.40 S  
Arrival: 20 January 1941 2235 hours

No. 85 of 20 January

Re: Telegram of 31st, No. 1456 with Pol. VIII

The Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now that the British minister in Bangkok made the following proposal for mediation to the government of Siam on 17 January, at the instigation of DeGaulle supporters in Indo-China:

- 1). Cessation of hostilities.
- 2). Indo China hands over the territories Lunng, Prabang and Pakse to Siam. In return for which Siam cedes to Indo-China a number of islands in the Mekong River as well as a further narrow strip of territory through which the impression of an exchange of territories is created to save Indo-China's face.

The Vice Foreign Minister stated that the Japanese Government is determined not to put up with a British success in this important area of the Greater East Asian Sphere. For this reason the government today again proposed to Bangkok, Vichy and the Governor General of Indo-China mediation along the following basis:

- 1). Immediate cessation of hostilities.
- 2). Acceptance of Japanese mediation.
- 3). Ceding the territories Luang, Prabang and Pakse to Siam without any reciprocity.

The Vice Foreign Minister added that Japan was ready to guarantee the final settlement of the border disputes. The Vice Foreign Minister mentioned in the further course of the conversation that the French Government had recognized Japan's leadership in the Far East through a statement by the French Ambassador here in August of last year. Hence it has been pointed out to the Vichy government that hereafter also the British mediation proposal was out of the question. The French Ambassador here and the chairman of the French Economic Commission, Robin, had recognized Japan's move as justified and promised to influence Vichy and the Governor General in this sense by telegraph.

The Vice Foreign Minister asked me to wire the circumstances to the German government, requesting influence on the Vichy government, at which he again stressed the great importance of this matter for



Japan's leadership in the Far East. When he asked whether he should direct the same request to the Italian Ambassador, I agreed that the German government notifies Rome and should invite them to cooperate if Berlin thinks this advisable.

I have the impression that the Japanese government tries to press their demands with a threatening attitude, but that they will only in the last resort resolve upon the attack of Saigon, which has been discussed in Navy circles, in order not to jeopardize the economic negotiations with Indo-China which have progressed unexpectedly well thus far, and in order not to provide America with a pretext for intervention.

OTT

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025 E (4).

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus





DOC 4025E(4)

(一) 敵対行為、即時中止

(二) 日本、調停、受諾

(三) ルアン・プラバン及びバクセ地方、報償を以て

タイ國へ割譲

外務次官ハ日本ハ國境紛争、三條決定、爲保護ヲ引受ケル用意ガアルト附言シタ。

外務次官ハ今後が更に進ミガ時次、如ク云フ。

即チ佛蘭西政府ハ昨年八月宣地、佛蘭西大使、聲明ニ依ツテ極東ニ於ケル日本、指導ヲ承認シタ。

「グイシー」政府ハ其レ故ニ此、後モ英國、調停案ハ

問題トナラヌトイフ様ニ指示サレタ。宣地、佛蘭西大使及ビ佛蘭西總務委員、主席「ロビ」ハ日本、処置ヲ

宣地ナリト承認シ「グイシー」及ビ印なな那總督ニ此、意味デ打電シテ最良答ヲなヘルヲ約束シタ。

外務次官ハ独逸政府ニ「グイシー」打電シ「グイシー」政府ヘ、働き掛ケラレ「グイシー」要請シタ。ソ、際彼ハ

今一答、此、問題、極東ニ於ケル日本、指導ニ對スル異常ナル重要性ヲ指摘シタ。彼ハ同様ニ要請ヲ

伊太利大使ニモナス、余カ「グイシー」彼、後由ニ對シテハ余ハ同意シテ次、如ク述べタ。独逸政府ハ羅馬ニ通

スル若シモ伯林ガ宣地ト考ヘルナラバ協力ヲ要請スル旨アルト。

10.2.



DOC 4025E(4)

余に次、如キ印象ヲ得タ。即チ日本政府に脅迫的態  
 度ニヨリ、ソノ要ヲ貫徹セント欲スデアル。然レシテ  
 日本政府に海軍側ニヨリ論セラレタ西貢へ、前進ハ  
 危急ノ際ニ、決メスル。之ハ世近予期ニ及シテ  
 良好ニ進行シテキル印を文部ト通商會談ヲ危ク  
 セ又爲及ビ米國ニ干渉、以テ更テ又ハ爲デアル。

オット

40255E(4)

書類第四〇二五E(四)號

證

余 Ulrich Straus 余獨逸語及  
日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ  
獨逸語原文及ニ日本語原文ヲ對照  
シ上右ノ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯  
セルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus

No. 4



Item 11.

St.S. No. 477

Berlin, 12 July 1941.

on  
The Japanese Ambassador who called/me today for another reason, mentioned that he has recently had a lively exchange of telegrams with his Foreign Minister. He had tried to cause him to fix the center of gravity of future Japanese policy, and to making his choice between North and South, since a scattering of Japan's forces was impractical. MATSUOKA had agreed with OSFIMA in principle without naturally giving a concrete answer.

I then asked the Ambassador how matters stood at present with Indo-China. OSFIMA replied that actually the occupation of certain positions in South Indo-China as bases for warships and planes is indeed a pressing need for Japan. It was another question as to whether the French Government should be previously notified or merely sounded out. OSFIMA did not think the action against South Indo-China imminent. He named no definite time to me and believed Tokyo would probably await a good opportunity. (OSFIMA does not seem to know of the 17 July date mentioned in Telegram 1181 from Tokyo).

OSFIMA held forth on the further development of Japanese-American relations but he was obviously either badly informed by Tokyo or completely uninformed. Rather he wanted to hear something new from me. Concerning this I told him we were in receipt of a report from Ambassador Ott, only partly decoded thus far, which seemed to say that Tokyo did in the meantime receive news from Washington. I could not talk about this without having complete particulars. On the other hand, I had personally noticed the ease and imperturbability of the Americans while settling down in Iceland. Did OSFIMA suppose that the Americans felt their rear in the Pacific to be as secure as the Iceland case actually indicated? OSFIMA replied to this that we were, of course, aware of his own opinion as to how America should be dealt with. Again recently he had advised MATSUOKA to call off the conversations with Washington without ceremony. (I do not believe that OSFIMA is aware of the fact that Tokyo is in possession of an answer from Washington; as this was reported us by the well known source through the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.

Herewith to the German Foreign Minister.

/s/ WEIZSAECKER



Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(6).

/s/ Ulrich L. Straus



not used doc 4025E(6)

伯林一九四二年(昭和十七年)七月十二日

内閣書記官長第四七七号

本日他ノ理由デ余ノ許ニ来テ居タ日本大使次  
如ク求ベタ。即チ彼ハ最近日本外務大臣ト活  
潑ニ電報ノ交換ヲ爲シタ。彼ハ外務大臣ニテ後  
日本ノ政策ノ重要ヲ確定シ南カ北カヲ決スル  
事ニ賛成サセ様ト試ミタ。何トナレバ日本ノカノ散  
逸ハ実用的デナリカラデアル。原則ニ於テハ松岡ハ  
大島ニ勿論具體的ニハ言ヒ現ハササカッタガ彼  
ハ正レイトミッタ。

余ハソレニ關聯シテ大使ニ休今印度支那ト  
ノ様ニナウテアルノカト訊ネタ。大島ハ次ノ答  
ヘタ。事實上南部印度支那ノ或ル地点ノ占  
領ハ航空機タビ軍艦ノ據点トシテ實ニ切実  
ナ日本ノ要求デアル。佛蘭西政府ガ豫メ通告  
サレルカ或ハ工政府ニヨリ單ニ意嚮ヲ探ルカハ  
別問題デアルト。大島ハ南部印度支那ニ對スル  
進駐ヲ近々ニ差迫ウテアルトハ考ヘテ平ナカッタ。彼  
ハ余ニ決シテ期間ヲ知ラサナカッタ。而シテ東京デ  
多分好機ヲ待ツデアラウト信イテアル。(東京発  
第二一八号電報々々中ニ述ベラシテアル七月  
十七日トイフ期日ヲ大島ハ知ラヌ如ク見エル)  
日米關係ノ今後ハ天展ニ關シテ大島ハ若干ノ  
觀察ヲ爲シタ。彼ハ然レ本國カラ明ニ情報ヲ能

ク貰フテ耳ナイカ、亦ハ全然受取ツテ耳ナカニタ。  
 寧テ口彼ハ余ヨリ何カ新しフコトヲ聞カニト欲シ  
 テナタ。之ニ對シテ余ハ彼ニ言ハツタ。此處ニ今テ是ニ  
 一部ハカダケ解讀サレタオット大使ノ報告ガアル。  
 之ハ余ニハ東京ハ此ノ間ワシントンカラノ報告  
 ヲ得テ耳ルトイフ主ニ目テアルト思ハレル。完全ナ  
 論據ガナシ、テ余ハ之ニ関シ余ノ意見ヲ述ベル  
 コトハデキヌ。之ニ反シ如何ニ無遠慮且平氣デ  
 米國ハ今テ「アイスランド」ニ落着イタコトイフコト  
 ハ私人ノ注意ヲ惹イタ。米國ガ「アイスランド」  
 ノ事件ヲ本末予定シテ耳ルカ、如クソノ太平  
 洋ニ於ケル背後ヲ夫程安全ニ思フテ耳ルト大  
 島ハ考ヘハカト。大島ハ之ニ對シテ唯、如何ニ米  
 國ハ行動ス、マキカニ關スル彼自身ノ考ヘハ我々  
 孰知サシテ耳ルト合ヘタ。彼ハ最近モ亦松岡ニ  
 フレンド會議ヲキツ、ベリ中断スル様ニ兩ビ忠告  
 シタ。(余ハ大島ガ東京ニワシントンカラノ回答ガ  
 届イテ耳ルトイフ事ヲ知リテ耳ルトイフコトヲ  
 信ジナシ。此ノ事ハ最初ニ周知ノ起源カラ在  
 東京伊太利大使ヲ通ジテ我々ニ知ラサシテ耳タ  
 ーテアル。)

本又ヲ以テ

独逸國外務大臣閣下ニ  
 署名 ヴァイスセツカー



Doc 4025-E(6)

書類第四〇二五三(六)號

證

余 Ulrich Straus (余カ独逸語及日本語  
ニ精通セル者ナリトシテニ独逸語原文及日本  
語原文ヲ对照シ上ニ本書類ヲ具実ニ且正  
確ニ翻譯セルモノナリトシテ確證ナルコトヲ茲ニ證

Ulrich A Straus

*not used*

Item 16.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Bangkok, 1 September 1941 1200 hours

Arrival: 2 September 1941 140 hours

Bangkok, No. 271 of 1 September 1941

Since direct telegraphic connection with Berlin is not yet possible, I am sending the following telegram from Saigon via Bangkok:

SAIGON, No. 1 of 25 August 1941.

When passing through Hanoi, where I was received by the French authorities with the same emphasis on correctness as at Saigon, I had a talk of about one hour with Admiral Decoux on the situation of Indo-China.

Opening the conversation, the Governor General remarked that he was a convinced partisan of Franco-German cooperation, which he repeated several times during the conversation, whereupon he made a survey of events in Indo-China from September of last year up to date without saying anything essentially new. He stressed that the inner situation of Indo-China does not warrant apprehension and that his negotiations with the British authorities in Hongkong and Singapore, which had been necessary because the colony needed certain imports were progressing smoothly. The difficulties now faced by Indo-China are entirely caused by the Japanese; he accused them of dishonesty and principally accused them of having incited Siam against Indo-China. Japanese infiltration into South Indo-China has been carefully prepared since January of this year by ever increasing demands. The ultimatum, however, came as a surprise to him. The reasons given by the Japanese for the occupation of Cochinchina and Cambodia are not sound, since there was no De-Gaullist movement in Saigon, nor had there been indications that England wanted to beat Japan to the punch. In contrast to the Japanese occupation of Tongking, that of South Indo-China had been carried out without friction thus far; however, the demands of the Japanese army were extremely broad. He was not clear on the real objective of the Japanese push towards the South but doubts an attack on Bangkok and gives no credence at all to a Japanese attack on Singapore.



Concluding, the Governor General expressed the hope that Franco-German cooperation may save Indo-China from being absorbed by Japan and that the colony be preserved for Europe.

There are various judgments concerning the Governor General among French circles here. The Vichyites blame him for a lukewarm attitude towards the De Gaulle movement as well as for Anglo-phobe tendencies. There is a general complaint on the lack of energy and initiative on the part of the administration, accepting without contradiction Japanese demands, even if unjustified and exaggerated; unfounded optimism and embellishment.

To say that there is no De-Gaullist movement in Saigon is at variance with the facts. Admiral Beronger and other well informed Frenchmen have assured me that in December of last year and in May of this year, there was serious danger of a British inspired coup d'etat at Saigon. Each time the Governor General had been informed in time about it but had reacted only at the last minute. The Japanese had accurate information from French and Italian sources here. I am in possession of a list of leading De-Gaullists (names of confidants).

Furthermore, the Vichyites find fault with the Governor General for his personnel policy (continued employment of freemasons in important positions and non-admittance to influential positions of energetic personalities) as well as for his letter of 28 June 1940 to General Catroux which Catroux photostated for his friends here and in which Decoux assures him of his unconditional loyalty.

A copy is also in my possession though now made obsolete by the events. The situation in Indo-China is quiet. The methods of administration are as cumbersome as before the war. On the whole the same men occupy the same positions. The Japanese occupation has brought about a pooling of interests of the French and Annamites, skillfully fostered by the French through sympathetic handling of native problems and conferring the Legion of Honor on numerous Annamite officials. Opposed to it, the Japanese propaganda, the soul of which is the Japanese Consul General Minoda here, a member of the Pan-Asiatic League, and about which the French are informed down to the smallest details, is ineffective. Japanese propaganda is spread mainly with the argument that the white race has no longer any business in Indo-China as was expressly confirmed by us through the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese are an object of curiosity to the Annamites and are attractive to them, for aesthetic and racial reasons. Heavy emphasis is laid on the loyal atti-

tude of the Emperor of Annam.

The economic situation is especially difficult. While Indo-China has lived up to its obligations resulting from the economic agreement with Japan, the latter has thus far shipped nothing to Indo-China. Owing to the absence of all possibilities to import or export with a prospect for profit, excepting raw materials essential for war, a further shrinking of economic activity is to be expected. The situation is worsened by lack of gasoline and the roads are completely deserted. Prices have risen considerably. Expenses in Fanoi have doubled since 1939 with Saigon 50% more expensive than Hanoi.

Identical telegrams to Tokyo and Bangkok.

NEUMANN.



Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(9).

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

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/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

Doc. 4025E(9)

not used

No. 1.

電報 (秘密暗号法)

バニツ 一九四二年(昭和十六年)九月一日 十二時。分

着 九月二日 一時四。分

一九四二年九月一日附第二十七号

伯林、直通電報連絡、未だ不能、爲、余、西貢カラバニツ、經由下  
記電報報告ヲ送ル

一九四二年八月二十五日附西貢第二号

河内通過ニ際シ其所、西貢ト同様佛蘭西官憲カラ、歡迎會ハ強調サ  
メ、正確ニテ余、約一時間、印度支那情勢ニ附ドク提督ト會談ヲ爲  
シタ。提督、手始ニ——→彼、獨佛協力、確信、的、信奉者ナル述  
ベ、會談中屢々繰返シタ。次ニ去年九月カラ今日迄、印度支那事件概  
觀ヲ述ベ、之、本質、的、ニ新ラシキ、ハ何モ含ミ居カズ、彼、印度支那、國內情  
勢、如何ナル不安ヲ惹起シ居ナ、事及ビ此、植民地、或ハ輸入必需品ヲ考慮  
スル、爲メ必要アリタ。香港及ニガボルニ於ケル英國官憲ト、彼、交渉、摩擦無  
ク進行シタル事ヲ強調シタ。

目下印度支那が遭遇シタル諸困難、彼ガ、一、早分サヲ容メ又彼ガ、就中、タイ  
國、印度支那、對ニ侵襲、罪ヲ責メタ、日本、ヨリス、惹起、ハ、タ、ナル。日本、南部  
印度支那、ノ、侵入、本年、月以降、絶、ス、増加、スル、要求、ヨリ、入念、準備、サ、タ。  
遂ニ然、ニ、カ、ラ、彼、ハ、最後、通牒、形、ガ、不意、ニ、マ、タ、来、タ。

西貢、於、ハ、ト、エ、ル、派、運動、モ、英國、ガ、先、鞭、ヲ、附、ケ、ント、ス、ル、微、候、ニ、無、カ、タ、カ、ラ、夫  
駐、支、那、又、カ、来、タ、占、領、ニ、對、ス、ル、日本、理由、確、實、ニ、モ、テ、ハ、無、カ、タ。日本、南部  
印度支那、占、領、ハ、東京、ト、又、對、ニ、近、摩、擦、モ、ヲ、行、ハ、タ。然、モ、尚、日本、軍、部、  
要求、ハ、異常、ニ、廣、汎、ナル。南方、ハ、日本、ノ、圧、迫、ノ、本、来、目的、ニ、付、テ、彼、ハ、自、分、ノ、  
明、瞭、ニ、シ、タ、然、ニ、彼、ハ、バ、ニ、ツ、ハ、前、進、ヲ、疑、フ、ヲ、居、リ、決、シ、テ、彼、ハ、日本、ノ、シ、ガ、ボ、ル



Doc. 4025E(9)

攻撃ヲ信ジテ、最後ニ總督ハ獨佛協力ハ印度支那ヲ日本ニ依リ吸收サレシム事カ  
ヲ護ラント欲シ、又植民地ヲヨーロッパハ爲ニ殘ニテ置クテアラウトイフ希望ヲ述ベタ。

當地、佛蘭西人社會ハ總督ハ色々ニ批判サレタリ。グイシー派ハ彼ニ對シ、ド  
ゴール派運動ニ對スル生ヌル態度ト親英米傾向ヲ答メタリ。一般のニ政府精  
カト自主性ノ不足、不當ニテ極端ナル日本ノ要求ニ對シテスラ更ニ對ズニ後退スル  
事根據ナキ樂觀及ビ虛飾等ニ對シテ苦情ガ云ハレタリ。

西貢ニ於テ、ドゴール派運動ガ無イト云フ事ハ宛ニ向テ事トテ矛盾ナルベラシエ  
提督カラ、又他ノ事情通、佛蘭西人側カラ、余ハ昨年十月及本年五月英國人  
ニ挑発セシテ生ジク西貢ニ於ケル政變ニ至ル大ナ危險ガ存在シタリ。

總督ハ此間シテ常ニ友好時ニ知ラセテ受テタ、然シ今ノ最後ノ瞬間迄之處  
ジナカラ、日本ハ當地、佛蘭西及伊太利筋カラ正確ニ情報ヲ得テキタ。指導的  
ドゴール派ノ人々ノ(腹心ノ人物ノ名前ニ因スル)表ハ余ノ手中心ニ在ル。

總督ハ更ニヤシー派ニヨリテ、彼ノ人事行政(重要地位ニ秘密英清組合員ヲ  
殘ニテ置キ、事務カナル地位カラ精力的ノ人物ヲ遠ザル事)及ビ一九四〇年六月  
ニ日附ノカトル將軍宛、彼ノ文書ニヨリ責ラレタリ。此ノ文書ヲ「カトル」ハ彼ノ當  
地ニ居ル友人ノ爲ニ寫眞撮ラセ、此ノ文書中「ドゴール」ハ彼ヲ「カトル」ノ無條件  
に従者ト断言シテサレタリ。事件ヨリ無用ニシタガ此ノ文書ノ寫モノ一枚余ハ持ツ

テキル。印度支那ノ狀勢ハ平穩ナル戰前ト同様ニ危ナキ行政方法大體ニ於テ  
同ジ人々ガ同ジ地位ニ居ル。日本占領ハ原住民ノ問題ノ親切ヲ取扱ヒヨリ佛蘭西人  
ガ巧妙ニ運営スル佛蘭西人、安南人利益共同作ラセタリ。安南人官吏ニ

レシインドノイル勲章ノ澤山ヲ授與、之ニ又佛蘭西人ガ徹底的ニ敵ハタレ且  
ソ中心ハ汎アジア聯盟ノ會員ナル当地ノ農田日本總領事ナル日本ノ宣  
傳ハ効果ガ無い日本ノ宣傳ハ主トシテ白色民族ハ印度支那ニ居ル理由ハ最早  
ナキ事ハ我々が三國協定ヨリ明瞭ニ認メタ事ナルトイフ議論ト共ニ續ク

Doc. 4025E(9)

テナル

安南人ト云ハ日本人ハ此迄寧ロ好意ニト美的及人種的理由カラ本能的嫌  
悪ノ対象ヲ成セタ。安南皇座ノ忠實ノ態度ハ著シク強調サレテナル。

経済状態ハ殊ニ困難ナル。印度支那ガ日本ト経済協定カラ義務  
ヲ果タシニ曰ハ之迄未ダ何モ印度支那ニ供給ヲ爲サカク事ヲ需資材ヲ  
除キ利益ヲ約束スルハ輸入及輸出ノ可能性ガ無クエタ。爲今後ノ経済  
生活ノ衰微ガ期待サレカ。リン不足ノ爲情勢ハ險惡化シ道路全  
ク荒廢シタ。價格ハ永市騰貴シタ。何内デハ一九三九年ニ比シニ倍高  
ク西貢デハ更ニ何内リ五十パーセント高リ。

東京ハベニコクニ同文電報セリ

ノイマン



Doc. 4025E(9)

言類第四。二五三(九)號

證

余 Ulrich Straus 余が獨逸語及日本語ニ精通セル者ナ  
ルコト並ニ獨逸語原文及日本語原文ヲ對照、上右ノ本書  
類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus.

no. 4

Doc. No. 4025E(11)  
Item 18

None  
Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

SAIGON 17 January 1942 1839 hours  
Arrival: 18 January 1942 20.15 hours

No. 5 of 16 January 1942.

Re: Telegram 49 of 15th

1.) Since my last report, the situation within and on the borders of Indo-China has remained quiet throughout.

The relations between the French and the Japanese are slowly becoming less tense although there still exist many points of friction, above all the problem of the Chinese, and due to further requisition measures on the part of the Japanese, who have occupied all valuable technical and scientific institutions, notably in COCHIN-CHINA, or are using them for their own purposes (e.g. PASTEUR Institute in SAIGON). In the beginning, after the Pacific War had broken out, the Japanese were still very suspicious of the French; now they acknowledge the loyal attitude of the French authorities and of the French population which has contributed to the Japanese successes to a considerable extent. Since both parties seriously try to avoid incidents, a satisfactory modus vivendi is not impossible in the long run. In French circles the hope that in the end Indo-China will be preserved as a European colony is again rising, being the only European possession in the Southeastern Pacific that is not at war with JAPAN.

The importance of Indo-China for JAPAN's war effort cannot be over emphasized. Events have borne out that the occupation of Indo-China through which the Anglo Saxon Powers lost without a fight their first step against the Japanese has made possible the Japanese successes. Thus, the Japanese air attack on the British battleships near the coast of MALAYA was carried out from the airbase TANSON NHUT near SAIGON. At present, CAMRANH is the most important operations--and behind-the-lines-base of the Japanese Navy. The attacks on BORNEO are carried out mostly from there. According to a reliable report from a resident in NHUATRANG, of whose district CAMRANH is a part, there were, at times, over 100 transports, as well as entire squadrons of the Japanese Navy at anchor there.



On 1 January I myself observed in CAMRANH 25 transports, 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers and 4 submarines. The Governor General, now in SAIGON for several weeks, told me that their number has meanwhile increased. The Governor General calculates there are now only about 25,000 Japanese occupation troops in Indo-China, of which 10,000 are garrisoned in the North and the rest in the South. In the future, further Japanese troop transports via HAINAN / HAIPHONG and from there to SAIGON by rail will probably have to be reckoned with, since the sea-lanes in the South China Sea have become insecure owing to JAPAN's Achilles heel, the submarine peril. Enemy U-boats have already been sighted repeatedly off the Annamite coast. Outside QUINHON Bay a Japanese transport has been torpedoed according to reliable French reports. Details concerning this are not known. Japanese losses are denoted higher here than is admitted publicly, since considerable transports of wounded and sick are constantly passing SAIGON by sea on the way to JAPAN.

2.) The Governor General voiced considerable displeasure over the Japanese propaganda among Chinese circles here as well as with the Chinese in COCHIN CHINA who had gone over to NANKING, as reported by DOMEI. He had strictly ordered the heads of the Chinese guilds to abstain from all political activity. This had been observed. If the Chinese in Indo-China now decide for NANKING, it clearly stems from nothing but opportunistic reasons, not from an inner change of sentiment: such a change is all the less likely since the members of guilds were forced to give considerable contributions to NANKING.

Considerable difficulties have also been created by the remaining of the former Chinese Consul in SAIGON who is still in KONTUM. Whereas the Japanese at first did not object to the Consul's departure to China they now ask that he be exchanged for the former Secretary of the Japanese Consulate General at HANOI who had been arrested on Chinese soil in the summer of 1939 near the border of KWANGSI and was later transferred to CHUNGKING (cf. my report from HANOI at the time). The relations between FRANCE and CHUNGKING are still the same as heretofore despite changed conditions in the Pacific. At any rate there are as yet no indications from VICHY of the turn-about in NANKING's favor. In this connection the Governor General made mention of information from various sources, especially the usually well-informed French charge d'affaires

at CHUNGKING to the effect that CHIANG KAI SHEK was seriously thinking of coming to terms with JAPAN through NANKING under the impact of Anglo-Saxon defeats in the Pacific, despite the WASHINGTON New Year's Pact. The persistent rumors apparently emanating from Japanese circles here (Ambassador YOSHISAWA), that the government of the Netherlands East Indies is likewise ready to leave the Allies in order to conclude a defensive pact with JAPAN on the Indochinese pattern, seem to have been made obsolete by events.

Identical Telegram to TOKYO.

NEULANN.



Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of Internation Prosecution Document No. 4025E(11).

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

used 4025E (11)

電報 (秘密暗號法)

西貢

(一九四二年(昭和十七年)一月十七日十八時三九分)

十六日二十時十五分

四二年一月十五日附 才五號  
十五日附電報才四九號參照

一、余、最後ノ報告以來、印度支那境界内部及近辺ノ狀態ハ不相當平穩ヲ保テ来タ。

佛蘭西人ト日本人間ノ關係ハ條々ニ緊張ヲ緩ク始メタ。尤モ、未ダ多クノ摩擦面が存在スル。就中支那人問題ニ於テ又、非常ニ重要ナル日本ノ押收処置ノ結果ハ多クアル。此ノ押收ハ元價値多キ技術及科學的ノ施設ヲ殊ニ交趾支那ニ於テト領シ又ハ彼等ノ目的ノ爲ニ要求多クアル。(例ハ西貢ノハストウール研究所)太平洋戦争勃発當初以來佛蘭西人ニ對シテ未ダ非常ニ疑ヲ懷イテ来タ。日本人ハ今ヤ彼等ノ成功ニ少カラズ貢獻多ク佛蘭西人官吏及住民ノ忠誠的態ヲ認メテ来ル。双方ニテ突発事件ヲ避ケルニ真摯ナ努力ヲシテ来ル。結局ニ於テ耐ヘ得ベキ程度ノ假條約ハ不可能ナハライ。佛蘭西人社会デハ、即ち支那ヲ日本ト交战セサル南太平洋ニ於テ唯一ノヨーロッパ領地トシテ結局ヨリ必ハ植民地トシテ保ツテ置クウトス。





4025 E (11)

病人輸送が日本向々海路ヲ西貢ヲ通過シテ中ルカウズ。

ニ總督ハ當地ノ支那人社会ヘノ日本ノ宣傳及ビ同盟ニ  
ヨリ報導サレタ交趾支那ノ支那人ノ南京側ヘノ動  
變付キ非常ニ不機嫌ニ意見ヲ吐イテ中々。彼ハ  
個々ノ支那人結社ノ首領ニ凡ソル政治的活動ヲ遠  
慮スル様ニ命ジタ。之ハ又遵守サレタノデアル。若シモ  
今印度支那ニ中ル支那人ガ日本ノ壓迫下ニ南京ノ方  
ヲ選ビバ之ハ單ニ見エ透イタ日和見的理由カラ起  
ルノデアツテ中ノ志操ノ急變カラデハナイ。斯ル  
志操ノ變化ハ結社ノ社員ガ強制的ニ多額ノ寄附  
ヲ南京ノタメニ爲サネバナラナキタ以上益々少ナルモ、  
ト思ハシル。前西貢駐在支那領事、滞在問題  
ガ甚ダ難ニイ問題ヲ惹起シテ中ル。此ノ領事ハ  
未ダフコントラニ居ルノデアル。日本人ハ最初領事  
ノ支那ヘノ出發ニ對シテハ何モ反對シナカッタガ今  
日本人ハ一九三九年夏廣西省境ノ支那領ヲ逮  
捕サシ後ニ重慶ニ移送サレタ前在河内日本總  
領事館課長トノ交換ヲ要求ニタノデアル。(當時  
ノ余ノ河内カラ、報告參照)尚佛蘭西ト重  
慶トノ關係ハ太平洋ノ狀勢變化ニモ不拘之  
迄ト同様デアル。兎ニ角南京ヘノ輾向ヲナサ  
シメ得ル如キ如何ナル徵候モ向ザイニシカラ  
来ナイ。

總督ハ此ニ関聯シテ更ニ種々ノ筋カラ、即チ  
博識ノ重慶ニ中ル佛蘭西人代理公使ノ次



4025E(11).

ノ如キ情報ヲ述ビタ。即チ蔣介石、太平洋ニ於  
ケル米英ノ敗北ノ印象ヲ受ケテ、ワシントンノ正  
條約ニ拘ラズ南京ヲ通ジテ日本ト妥協スル事  
ヲ眞面目ニ考ヘテキルト。

明ニ当地ノ日本人社会(芳沢大使)カラ生ジ仲々  
消エヨウトナイ。蘭印政府モ同盟国カラ離シ  
印度支那ノ例ニ倣ツテ日本トノ防衛協  
定ヲ結ブ用意ガアルト云フ噂ハ事件ニヨリ  
無用ニフツタト思ハレハ。

東京(同)電報セリ。

／＼／

Doc 4025E(11)

書類 四〇二五 E (十一) 號

證

余 Ulrich A. Straus : 余が獨逸語及  
日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ  
獨逸語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對照  
シ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セ  
ルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス。

Ulrich A. Straus